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Using Phenomenal Concepts to Explain Away The Intuition of Contingency 
 
Nicholas Shea 
 
 
 
 
 Abstract 
Humans can think about their conscious experiences using a special class of 
‘phenomenal’ concepts.  Psycho-physical identity statements formulated using 
phenomenal concepts appear to be contingent.  Kripke argued that this intuited 
contingency could not be explained away, in contrast to ordinary theoretical 
identities where it can.  If the contingency is real, property dualism follows.  
Physicalists have attempted to answer this challenge by pointing to special features 
of phenomenal concepts that explain the intuition of contingency.  However no 
physicalist account of their distinguishing features has proven to be satisfactory.  
Leading accounts rely on there being a phenomenological difference between 
tokening a physical-functional concept and tokening a phenomenal concept.  This 
paper shows that existing psychological data undermine that claim.  The paper goes 
on to suggest that the recalcitrance of the intuition of contingency may instead by 
explained by the limited means people typically have for applying their phenomenal 
concepts.  Ways of testing that suggestion empirically are proposed. 
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(1) Introduction 
Although there are good arguments for physicalism, an obstacle to its acceptance is its 
incompatibility with some deeply-held intuitions.  Whatever physical-functional property is 
offered as a candidate for a psycho-physical identity claim, whether it involves neural 
substrates, patterns of brain activity (synchrony, recurrence, resonance), informational 
integration / binding, neurofunctional roles, sensorimotor loops, feedback circuits, or even 
social interactions, the proposed identity elicits a strong intuition that that property could, at 
best, only be contingently connected to the subjective character of experience.  If the 
connection really were contingent, then there would of course be no identity.  Nor is this just a 
problem with the currently-available theories.  The intuition runs deeper: that no putative 
scientific characterisation could do the job. 
 These residual dualist intuitions present an obstacle to the acceptance of physicalism.  
There is a long tradition of seeing it in the first instance as a dualism of concepts.1  As with 
theoretical identities like heat = molecular kinetic energy, while we retain separate concepts 
we can still formulate the possibility claim: it is possible that heat ≠ molecular kinetic energy.  
Of course, if the identity is true, then it is necessarily true, and the claim about metaphysical 
possibility is false.  Before the identity is known, the dual concepts can be used to express an 
epistemic possibility (heat ≠ molecular kinetic energy).  Even when the identity is known (so 
that heat ≠ molecular kinetic energy is neither metaphysically nor epistemically possible), an 
intuition of contingency arises, which can be explained by a closely-related genuine possibility: 
that something other than molecular kinetic energy might have been responsible for causing 
the same sensations.  But that move is not available to the physicalist who wants to explain 
away the apparent contingency of a psycho-physical identity, since the sensation itself features 
in the identity.  There is no gap between the referent and the signs by which it is identified, so 
there is no place in which to locate a nearby genuine possibility.  That is Kripke’s challenge 
(Kripke, 1972).  Unable to answer it, Kripke draws a dualist conclusion. 
 The challenge to the physicalist is to explain why, when faced with a psycho-physical 
identity claim,2 people should have an intuition of contingency.  Physicalists try to discharge 
that burden by pointing to special features of phenomenal concepts, the class of concepts we 
                                                 
1  (Locke, 1690), the ideas of thought and of solidity are ‘independent of one another’ (II.xxiii.32), i.e., logically 
independent (‘It is no more a contradiction that thinking should exist separate and independent from solidity 
than that solidity should exist separate and independent from thinking.’ Ibid).  For Locke this was the basis of 
property dualism, but he thought that the view was compatible with substance monism (IV.iii.6). 
2  ‘Psycho-physical identity claim’ is used as shorthand to cover both thoughts and sentences.  At the level of 
thought it involves a phenomenal concept and a physical-functional concept or concepts, connected by the 
relation usually expressed by ‘is identical to’ or ‘=’.  At the level of language, it is a sentence expressing such a 
thought. 
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use for thinking about our own experiences from the first-person point of view.  The 
‘phenomenal concept strategy’ is to show that we should expect people to have an intuition of 
contingency, even if physicalism is true and there are true psycho-physical identity claims.  
The importance of the phenomenal concept strategy is widely acknowledged, even by critics: 
 
‘This extremely interesting strategy is perhaps the most attractive option for a physicalist 
to take in responding to the problem of consciousness.’ 
(Chalmers, 2007, p. 168) 
 
 The strategy is not intended as an argument for physicalism from neutral premises.  
Instead, the aim is to diffuse anti-physicalist arguments that are based on the intuition of 
contingency.  The strategy is to presuppose physicalism and show that, if physicalism is true, 
we should expect people to have a recalcitrant intuition of contingency.  The positive support 
for physicalism derives from other sources, not discussed here.  Nevertheless, if a proper 
understanding of phenomenal concepts can indeed be deployed to explain away the intuition of 
contingency, then that constitutes significant progress towards a satisfactory metaphysics of 
mind. 
 The physicalist argument comes in two stages.  The first is to show that a dualism of 
concepts creates an intuition of contingency.  Section 2 individuates a class of phenomenal 
concepts that people plausibly possess (§2.1).  That allows a contingency claim to be 
formulated in the first place (§2.2).  The second stage is to explain why intuition of 
contingency is not displaced by good evidence for physicalism, unlike with other putative 
theoretical identities.  Section 3 argues that existing accounts fail.  Leading proposals rely on 
there being a general phenomenological difference between tokening a physical-functional 
concept and tokening a phenomenal concept, the phenomenal concept being 
phenomenologically richer or more phenomenologically akin to the experience to which it 
refers.  Section 3.1 shows that there is good empirical evidence against that claim.  These 
features are far from peculiar to phenomenal concepts.  Other accounts make phenomenal 
concepts too special, holding that they put the thinker in an especially direct epistemic 
relation with their referents.  Section 3.2 points to inadequacies in such proposals.  Section 4.1 
argues that the recalcitrance of the intuition of contingency could be explained by a rather 
prosaic limitation of the phenomenal concepts possessed by most thinkers.  Section 4.2 goes on 
to suggest ways of testing that hypothesis. 
 
 
 4 
(2) Phenomenal Concepts Generate an Intuition of Contingency 
2.1 Defining phenomenal concepts 
Physicalism comes in several varieties, all of which admit variants of the dialectic discussed 
here.  For present purposes I take physicalism to be the claim that all properties supervene, 
with metaphysical necessity, on physical properties.  Subjective or phenomenal character is 
sometimes described as a property of experiences, but having an experience with a certain 
subjective character is a property of a person.  For example, it is a property of Jane that she is 
having an experience as of the colour red.  So I will focus on psycho-physical identity claims 
concerning such phenomenal properties of conscious people. 
 Suppose our best scientific theory tells us that the property of having an experience as of 
red is complex physical/functional property A (or, if there are relevant phenomenal differences 
between people, that Jane’s having an experience as of red is complex physical/functional 
property A of Jane).  A is a phenomenal property and we can pick it out with a scientific 
physical-functional description, and also with the folk psychological term ‘having an experience 
as of red’ (I use ‘Q-red’ as shorthand for the folk psychological term).  We can also deploy 
concepts in thought that refer to phenomenal property A.  Phenomenal concepts form a proper 
subclass of the class of all concepts that refer to phenomenal properties. 
 A first pass at defining phenomenal concepts is that they are the sort of concepts that 
Jackson’s colour scientist Mary could not have in her black and white room (Jackson, 1986).  A 
person who actually has colour experiences can classify them together in virtue of what it’s 
like to undergo those experiences.  Loar argues that a subject can thereby acquire a disposition 
to classify together experiences in virtue of their phenomenal character, and so acquire a 
concept (Loar, 1990, 1997).  If the sort of identity claim at issue here is true, then the 
phenomenal property shared by these instances is in fact a physical-functional property.  
Papineau has a different view of phenomenal concepts, but his view also meets the constraint 
that a thinker can only acquire a phenomenal concept if she has experiences of the type to 
which the concept refers (Papineau, 2002). 
Focusing on this common feature, I will adopt the following definition: 
 
(PC) A person X’s concept C is a phenomenal concept 
iffdf 
(i) acquiring C requires X to instantiate or to have instantiated a phenomenal 
property F; and 
(ii) on acquiring C, X has the disposition to apply C to herself non-inferentially in 
virtue of instantiating the phenomenal property F; and 
(iii) C refers to F. 
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(PFC) Concept C is a physical-functional concept 
 iffdf 
C refers to a physical-functional property and is not a phenomenal concept. 
 
 The definition makes having a phenomenal concept a matter of how it was acquired. It 
does not rely on phenomenal concepts having a special mode of presentation or canonical 
evidence for their application (e.g. Sturgeon, 1994). Indeed, the definition is consistent with 
the rejection of Fregean sense for concepts. Nor is it committed to the subject having the 
experience to which the phenomenal concept refers every time they token the concept (only 
on acquisition). 
 Condition (ii) requires that the concept has a non-inferential mode of application.  For 
example, inferring that I must be angry by looking at my own face in the mirror would be non-
inferential within condition (ii).  This means that exercises of a phenomenal concept in the 
mode of application mentioned in PC show up at the personal level as immediate — the move 
from having the phenomenal experience to applying the phenomenal concept does not seem to 
be mediated by any intervening mental process.  Nevertheless a thinker’s having, on acquiring 
a phenomenal concept, the mode of application mentioned in PC is consistent with her being 
disposed to apply the concept in other ways as well.  Jane can apply ANGERPHEN to herself non-
inferentially when she feels angry, but she can also apply it to others, perhaps because they 
show outward signs and behave in ways that are similar to her own reactions when she feels 
angry. 
 Condition (iii) requires that, according to the correct theory of the reference of concepts, 
a phenomenal property F is the referent of C.  No claims are made here about what makes it 
the case that C refers to F.  The account is consistent both with phenomenal properties being 
ways that experience represents the world as being (intentionalism), and with their being raw 
feels.  Concepts of phenomenal properties are clearly representational, but the phenomenal 
properties themselves need not be. 
 An experienced blindsight patient might be able to learn to report certain information 
presented in his blind hemi-field without first performing an action to see how he will in fact 
behave (de Gelder et al., 1999; Milner & Goodale, 1995; Weiskrantz, 1986).  If so, he could 
deploy a concept HORZ-SLOTVISUAL that applies to cases where his dorsal visual processing 
represents that there is a horizontal slot (without an accompanying experience).  Applications 
of this concept could be non-inferential within PC(i), but HORZ-SLOTVISUAL would not be a 
phenomenal concept because it is not applied in virtue of instantiating a phenomenal 
property.3 
                                                 
3  Thanks to Daniel Stoljar for raising this query about the definition. 
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Definition PC draws the category of phenomenal concepts narrowly, in that concepts 
falling outside the definition might still generate a recalcitrant intuition of contingency 
according to the account offered below.  However, since it is relatively clear that many people 
do have phenomenal concepts within the terms of PC, it will be enough for present purposes to 
show why the intuition of contingency is recalcitrant in those cases.  It would be a bonus if the 
same scheme of explanation could be applied to a slightly wider class of concepts. 
 The class of phenomenal concepts is not drawn so as to make them too special.  I have 
not made a claim of transparency for phenomenal concepts — that they give the thinker any 
special or direct way of grasping the nature of their referents.  Nor does their application 
involve infallibility or incorrigibility.  Epistemically, they are just like any other concept that 
admits of non-inferential application (e.g. on some views concepts like WATER and JOHN can be 
applied non-inferentially on seeing water or John).  If concepts have modes of presentation, 
then the experience referred to by a phenomenal concept will itself be one of the modes of 
presentation of that concept. But the account is consistent with theories according to which 
concepts do not have modes of presentation. 
Recall that phenomenal properties are properties of the subject of experience, not 
properties of external objects (like the redness of a fire engine).  It is a nice question how 
people manage to acquire a disposition to classify together their own experiences in virtue of 
their subjective character, as distinct from classifying external objects in virtue of how those 
objects appear.  One test is that phenomenal concepts are applied to experiences even in the 
absence of an experienced external object.  So John is disposed to token his phenomenal 
concept of red experiences, RED-EXPCEPHEN when he recalls an experience of red in his visual 
memory or imaginatively recreates an experience of red. 
Some argue that the thinker must deploy a distinction between the subjective and the 
objective in order to acquire a disposition which is specific to phenomenal properties 
(Papineau, 2007a).  Certainly such a distinction can be deployed to generate a phenomenal 
concept.  But it is not clear that an explicit grasp of the distinction is necessary.  For example, 
John might form a concept of the feeling of being angry, ANGERPHEN, applying it to himself when 
he is angry in virtue of his instantiating the phenomenal property of feeling angry.  That seems 
possible without an explicit grasp of the subjective-objective distinction.  He just tokens 
ANGERPHEN when he has that characteristic feeling.  Since John’s feeling anger has heterogeneous 
causes and effects, it seems less likely that ANGERPHEN should refer to some property of the 
objects which tend to cause John to feel angry, nor to the behavioural effects of the feeling.  
So perhaps John can succeed in referring to his feeling of anger without deploying the 
sophisticated conceptual apparatus of an explicit subjective-objective distinction.  The 
everyday concept of pain is probably, for most people, a phenomenal concept, as are concepts 
of relatively general ways of classifying experience, like the concept of visual experience or of 
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aural experience.  It may be that these too can be acquired without deploying an explicit 
subjective-objective distinction. 
 
2.2 How phenomenal concepts explain conceivability 
The phenomenal concept strategy comes in two parts.  The first step is very straightforward: a 
dualism of concepts implies that thinkers are able to formulate contingency claims (e.g. that 
Q-red ≠ A is possible).  The second, more substantial, task is to point to further considerations 
to explain why that intuited contingency should not be displaced by good evidence for 
physicalism, or even by the belief that the identity is true (therefore necessarily so), unlike in 
the case of theoretical identities like heat = molecular kinetic energy and water = H2O.  
Sections 3 and 4 deal with the second step. 
 The first step only requires that people should have phenomenal concepts (within 
definition PC), and that they should deploy concepts in thinking about conscious experience 
third-personally or scientifically that were not initially acquired in virtue of having the 
experience in question (i.e. physical-functional concepts within definition PFC).  Equipped with 
two different concepts, whether or not those concepts in fact co-refer thinkers can formulate 
the thought that it is possible that Q-red ≠ A; or the thought that it is possible that a creature 
that instantiates physical-functional property A nevertheless is a zombie, lacking all conscious 
experience (thus not instantiating Q-red). 
Possession of phenomenal concepts can also explain the intuition that Jackson’s Mary 
learns something new when she leaves her black and white room (Jackson, 1986).  In the room 
she could not have the phenomenal concept RED-EXPCEPHEN.  On leaving the room and seeing 
various coloured objects she is able to acquire this new concept.  Jackson’s thought 
experiment works by thinking of Mary acquiring a new concept which she applies non-
inferentially to herself in virtue of instantiating the experience (rather than enriching her 
existing physical-functional concept of red experience to add in that mode of application).  
Then, using her new concept, she can think thoughts that were not available to her before; 
thoughts like wondering whether RED-EXPCEPHEN = RED-EXPCEPHYS-FNAL or believing that the identity 
holds.  So the phenomenal concept strategy can be deployed to explain the intuition elicited by 
the Mary thought experiment in a way which is compatible with physicalism. 
 
 
(3) Existing Accounts of the Recalcitrance of the Intuition of Contingency 
3.1 Evidence against a phenomenological difference 
So if people have separate phenomenal and physical-functional concepts, they have the 
resources to formulate the claim underlying the intuition of contingency.  Can the existence of 
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two concepts be finessed into an account of that recalcitrance of that intuition in the face of 
good evidence for physicalism?  In this section I argue that existing attempts to account for the 
intuition by means of phenomenal concepts are inadequate.  In particular, the common tactic 
of appealing to phenomenological aspects of the exercise of concepts is undermined by some 
under-appreciated psychological evidence. 
The intuition is doubtless partly due to the fact that we don’t yet know how the correct 
theory of consciousness will go (Shea & Heyes, 2010; Stoljar, 2006).  Although clearly 
important, such considerations can explain resistance to theoretical identities throughout the 
history of science.  They are not peculiar to identities concerning the mental.  If the intuition 
of contingency is particularly recalcitrant when it comes to psycho-physical identities, then the 
physicalist has some explaining left to do. 
The most common tactic adopted by proponents of the phenomenal concept strategy is to 
claim that the exercise of the two kinds of concepts is phenomenologically different.  The idea 
is that exercising a phenomenal concept has a distinctive experiential aspect — e.g. tokening 
RED-EXPCEPHEN  involves having a visual experience as of red — whereas exercise of a physical-
functional concept does not.4  The claim cannot just be that there is a difference in the 
phenomenology evoked by tokening RED-EXPCEPHEN and RED-EXPCEPHYS-FNAL (say), because that would 
be true of all theoretical identities.  To target a feature that is plausibly distinctive of psycho-
physical identities the phenomenal concept theorist claims that there is a general experiential 
difference between exercising phenomenal concepts, on the one hand, and exercising physical-
functional concepts, on the other. 
  For Loar, tokens of phenomenal concepts are caused by instances of the experience-
type to which they refer.  The phenomenology of entertaining a phenomenal concept is thereby 
so unlike the phenomenology of entertaining a physical-functional concept that, when they are 
brought together in thinking, ‘the illusion may be created that their references must be 
different’ (Loar 1997, p. 605).5  For Papineau exercise of a phenomenal concept actually makes 
use of a token experience of the type to which it refers, and thereby feels like having the 
experience.  By contrast, the exercise of physical-functional concepts ‘“leaves out” … the 
technicolour phenomenology’ (Papineau 2002, p. 170).  Tye’s explanation of the recalcitrance 
of the intuition of contingency similarly appeals to the phenomenology of concept exercise 
                                                 
4  The otherwise puzzling idea that a phenomenal concept resembles its referent may amount to the same thing.  
The claim cannot be resemblance at the level of content (it is trivially true that the property referred to by a 
concept resembles the property that features in the content of that concept), so it must be a claim about the 
conceptual vehicle, in which case it seems to be phenomenological properties of the vehicle which are in the 
frame. 
5  This is a different argument from the considerations based on the claim that phenomenal concepts are 
necessarily connected to their referents, and/or based on the supposed transparency of experience, which are 
discussed in the next subsection. 
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(Tye, 2003, §17), and the thought traces right back to the footnote in which Nagel launched 
the modern phenomenal concepts literature: ‘we put ourselves in a conscious state resembling 
the thing itself’ (Nagel, 1974, fn. 11). 
This tactic fails because the phenomenological difference between exercise of 
phenomenal and physical-functional concepts relied on to date is empirically unsustainable; 
and there are reasons to doubt that there is any relevant difference in the phenomenology of 
the exercise of the two types of concepts that could do the required explanatory work.  My 
objection has two strands.  First, exercise of physical-functional concepts can carry perception-
like phenomenological properties.  Second, exercise of phenomenal concepts need not. 
A series of experiments show that perceptual phenomenology is generally involved in 
concept exercise, across a wide range of physical-functional concepts.  For example, cueing a 
particular perceptual modality affects which properties items in a given category are stated to 
have (Barsalou, Solomon, & Wu, 1999) and how quickly and accurately subjects verify whether 
or not items have such properties (e.g. whether LEAVES rustle) (Barsalou et al., 2005; Solomon 
& Barsalou, 2004).  Similar results are obtained whether the task is presented abstractly or 
subjects are asked to engage perceptual imagery, suggesting that perceptual imagery is 
involved in both cases.  Functional imaging confirms that brain areas involved in perception 
and perceptual imagery are also active in tasks that would seem only to require non-perceptual 
exercise of a concept (Kan et al., 2003; Simmons & Barsalou, 2003).6 
 The second strand of the objection is that exercise of phenomenal concepts need not 
involve the particular phenomenology to which the concept refers.  Consider the thought 
involving RED-EXPCEPHEN which is expressed by the following: I am not now having a red 
experience in perception or imagination.  That thought deploys the phenomenal concept RED-
EXPCEPHEN.  And it seems that we can sometimes when we think such a thought, it is true.  If so, 
the phenomenal concept can be deployed without instantiating the phenomenal property to 
which it refers.  It seems clear that, once one has acquired a phenomenal concept through 
instantiating the experience to which it refers, one can then exercise that concept in a range 
of ways that do not involve re-activation of experiences of the original type.  Such ‘non-
recreative’ uses of a phenomenal concept form the second strand of the objection.7 
 Caught between these two strands, it is hard to see that there could be a general 
phenomenological difference between the exercise of phenomenal and physical-functional 
concepts.  Both phenomenal concepts and physical-functional concepts can be tokened with 
and without accompanying perceptual-like phenomenology.  That makes it hard to point to a 
phenomenological difference in concept exercise that could explain the recalcitrance of the 
                                                 
6  Barsalou argues that modality-specific processing is constitutive of concept exercise; for our purposes it is 
enough that perceptual phenomenology is usually associated with exercise of physical-functional concepts. 
7  The objection is pressed by (Crane, 2005), but is independently credited to Kirk Ludwig by (Block, 2007, p. 282). 
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intuition of contingency; indeed, Papineau has given up on this tactic (Papineau, 2007a, 
2007b). 
 One way to try to hang onto the phenomenal concepts strategy here is to focus on 
occurrent uses.  The intuition of contingency is particularly compelling in the philosopher’s 
situation of applying a phenomenal concept to an aspect of her current perceptual experience 
(the experience being produced now by looking at a red folder, say) and at the same time 
entertaining a potential identity with a physical-functional property.  But there is a danger of 
that approach missing out on there being a concept, a re-usable element of thought and 
reasoning, which is applied to the experience.  If there is a concept involved in the occurrent 
case, then that concept can be re-used in the ways discussed above.  Without involvement of a 
concept, the occurrent case serves only to focus on the characteristic what-it’s-likeness of the 
occurrent experience.  That is not, on its own, a physicalist explanation of the intuition of 
contingency.  Furthermore, if the existence of current phenomenology were enough to 
generate an intuition of contingency, we should expect to find one with perceptual 
demonstrative concepts too.  But there seems to be no difficulty in identifying, for example, 
that shininess as being a property of the polished table surface, or indeed that redness as being 
a property of the surface of the folder.  
Those relying on a special experiential feature of phenomenal concepts need to point to 
an experiential difference between the exercise of phenomenal concepts and the exercise of 
physical-functional concepts.  Loar and Papineau appeared to claim that exercise of a  
phenomenal concept always involves re-activating the experience to which it refers, which is 
undermined by the clear existence of non-recreative uses of phenomenal concepts.  The claim 
could instead be that exercise of phenomenal concepts sometimes involves an associated 
phenomenology whereas exercise of physical-functional concepts never does.  That would be a 
clear difference between the two classes of concept.  But it is very unlikely to be true, in the 
light of data about the extent to which perceptual experiences are recreated by conceptual 
thought (data from Barsalou and others mentioned above).  So relying on an experiential 
difference to explain the recalcitrance of the intuition of contingency is unpromising. 
 
3.2 Inadequacies in other proposals 
Before giving my positive account, I will mention, more briefly, some other variants of the 
phenomenal concept strategy.  Papineau puts some weight on phenomenal concepts being 
indexical: the subject thinks about this ___ type of experience (where ___ is replaced in 
thought by an instance of the experience).  If the concept could only ever be used indexically, 
then the problem of accounting for non-recreative uses arises.  If the problem is supposed to 
be generated by the indexical way of introducing or acquiring the concept, it faces 
counterexamples.  I might rely on a demonstrative to introduce a concept of a particular way 
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of dancing, say: it is to dance thus.  That doesn’t make me resistant to a physical-functional 
way of picking out that type of behaviour.  Nor is the concept any more recalcitrant if I first 
use it in my own case.  For example, I might think about a particular way I have of combing my 
hair, forming a concept by thinking demonstratively as I brush (to C is to comb thus ___) 
((Heal, 1997), see also (Heal, 2004)).  Such concepts do not seem to resist merger or 
enrichment with (further) physical-functional modes of application, nor do they seem to 
generate a recalcitrant intuition of contingency. 
 Another tactic is to claim that phenomenal concepts stand in an especially tight 
epistemic relationship with their referents.  For example, Loar argues that phenomenal 
concepts are transparent (Loar 1990, pp. 98-99).  The notion of transparency can seem elusive 
to a physicalist. The rough idea is that exercise of the concept gets us on to the essential 
nature of the property to which it refers.  But direct reference does not imply transparency.  
That we have concepts that we can apply non-inferentially to ourselves in virtue of 
instantiating their referents does not by itself show that exercise of those concepts puts us in 
any special epistemic relation to their referents.  Indeed, if transparency is a matter of 
knowing facts about what is essential to or constitutive of being a phenomenal property, 
exercise of phenomenal concepts seems, taken alone, to deliver very little in the way of such 
knowledge.  So if transparency is supposed to be a rich source of knowledge, it is implausible 
that any of our concepts display transparency.  On the other hand, transparency may just be 
the idea that the concept is applied on the basis of a necessary connection to the referent.  
That would be true if there were phenomenal concepts which have the experience to which 
they refer as a their constitutive mode of presentation.  But then we are back into the 
empirical difficulty with claiming that this is true in any sense which is distinctive of 
phenomenal concepts. 
 Furthermore, Chalmers argues that the phenomenal concepts strategy cannot succeed if 
it relies on phenomenal concepts having an epistemic feature that uniquely depends upon 
having experiences (Chalmers, 2007).  If that were so, a zombie (a physical-functional 
duplicate) that lacked experiences would lack the special epistemic feature, undermining the 
claim that the special epistemic feature is physicalistically explicable.  The phenomenal 
concept strategist might object that such a zombie is impossible, leading us back into familiar 
debates.  But there is something to Chalmers’ idea that, if the phenomenal concept strategist 
relies on an epistemic feature that is unique to phenomenal concepts and is unable to 
elaborate on that feature in non-phenomenal terms, his account of the recalcitrance of the 
intuition of contingency will be correspondingly mysterious from the physicalist point of view, 
leaving the door open to the dualist, who will seize on the supposed unique epistemic feature 
and offer a more satisfying explanation of it in terms of the ontological difference between 
phenomenal properties and physical-functional ones.  My positive account of the recalcitrance 
of the intuition of contingency, given in the next section, relies on a rather prosaic and 
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contingent feature of our application of phenomenal concepts, which can be fully explained 
without relying on the phenomenality of their referents (indeed, which can arise in cases 
where the referent is not phenomenal at all, as in the blindsight case mentioned above).  So it 
side-steps Chalmers’ objection. 
 This section has not attempted a comprehensive review of all the variants of the 
phenomenal concept strategy.  Instead, I have argued that the most common tactic, which is to 
rely on an experiential difference between entertaining phenomenal concepts and entertaining 
physical-functional concepts, is untenable.  I have mentioned difficulties with other versions of 
the strategy, and while this falls far short of a decisive refutation, it should be sufficient to 
motivate searching elsewhere for a positive account of the recalcitrance of the intuition of 
contingency.  The next section offers such an account. 
 
 
(4) An Alternative Hypothesis 
4.1 A source of resistance to identities 
This section puts forward an alternative explanation for the recalcitrance of the intuition of 
contingency. §4.2 suggests ways of testing that hypothesis empirically. 
We start with an illustrative analogy.  William Bateson famously rejected the idea that 
chromosomes could be the basis of the inheritance of heritable phenotypic features (Darden, 
1977).  Walter Sutton and Theodor Boveri had hypothesised that chromosomes are the basis of 
heredity on the basis of a close match between some of their properties, like the fact that they 
operate in pairs (Darden & Maull, 1977, p. p. 52).  Morgan, who was initially sceptical, became 
convinced of the theory by work in his laboratory on linking of factors on chromosomes and 
crossing over (Darden, 2005).  Bateson’s particular resistance to the chromosome theory was at 
least partly because of his aversion to microscopy and the fact that he lacked a close colleague 
skilled in cytology (Cock, 1983).  He accepted that chromosomes could be treated as if it were 
the basis of heredity, but he seemed to take this as a kind of theoretical posit that should be 
taken merely instrumentally.  Without being able to see or manipulate the structure of nuclear 
chromatin, he just could not understand how it could be the basis of heredity, which led him to 
the claim that it was inconceivable that it could: 
 
‘In our present ignorance of the nature of life we cannot distinguish cause and effect in 
these phenomena and it is not possible to attach any satisfactory meaning to the 
expression that the sex-linked factors [i.e. heritable differences] are “carried” by a 
chromosome, but if any one wishes to describe the association or the phenomena in that 
way there is nothing to forbid it.  The properties of living things are in some way 
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attached to a material basis, perhaps in some special degree to nuclear chromatin; and 
yet it is inconceivable that particles of chromatin or of any other substance, however 
complex, can possess those powers which must be assigned to our factors or genes [genes 
being the hypothesised basis of heritable differences].  The supposition that particles of 
chromatin, indistinguishable from each other and indeed almost homogeneous under any 
known test, can by their material nature confer all the properties of life surpasses the 
range of even the most convinced materialism.’ 
(Bateson, 1916, p. 542, emphasis added) 
 
 The correspondence with today’s scepticism about mind-brain identities is striking.  
Replacing heritable features with phenomenal properties and particles of chromatin with 
properties of the brain converts Bateson’s text into a recognisable example of current 
scepticism towards materialism about phenomenal properties, even paralleling claims about 
inconceivability.  Of course, now that we know the structure of DNA and so much about its 
mechanism of operation, the identity — basis of heredity = chromosomes — is uncontroversial 
(at least in relation to very many heritable features).   
 Bateson had various ways of identifying chromosomes (chemical etc.) which together 
gave him a CHROMOSOME concept.  He also had the concept of THE CAUSAL BASIS OF HEREDITY, 
identified in part through the outcomes of breeding experiments.  But he didn’t believe the 
identity CHROMOSOMES = THE CAUSAL BASIS OF HEREDITY.  Nor could he see any way that he could come 
to believe the identity.  So he found it inconceivable that the identity could be true.  What he 
lacked (in part because of his limited facility with microscopy) was a way of identifying 
features of chromosomes, under his CHROMOSOME concept, in a way that made it plausible that 
chromosomes could also be identified under his CAUSAL BASIS OF HEREDITY concept.  Conceptual 
dualism made non-identity conceptually possible, and particular limitations in his ways of 
deploying those two concepts gave rise to a forceful intuition of contingency. 
 Concepts of physical properties can be enriched by acquiring new modes of application, 
as we learn more about the property.  One important way of learning about a physical property 
is by spatio-temporally tracking objects that have the property.  (We obviously learn about 
individuals by tracking them spatio-temporally, but it is less widely-recognised that spatio-
temporal tracking is important for learning about properties and how they tend to be co-
instantiated.)  For example, I may apply my CAT concept on the basis of an object being 
medium-sized, furry and making a miaow sound.  I can track this particular cat and learn that 
it purrs when stroked.  I don’t need to check that the purring thing still has the features of a 
cat, including checking again that it miaows, since I have already heard it miaow, and then I 
have tracked the object spatio-temporally to the one on which I am now experimenting by 
stroking it.  In this way, we can apply a property concept in part on the basis of hidden or 
dispositional properties of an object, track the object, and thereby later come to learn that 
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further properties tend to be co-instantiated with the initial property (Millikan, 2000).  This 
spatio-temporal tracking also allows us to intervene to learn the effects of various actions: to 
see which properties give rise to which other properties in objects of that type.  In this way, 
spatio-temporal tracking allows us to learn more, not just about the particular object, but also 
about things of its type, in particular to learn which other properties tend to be co-instantiated 
with that type.  So a property concept that starts with a very thin set of modes of application 
can be enriched into one that we can apply across vary many different circumstances relying on 
a large variety of properties. 
 Tracking is more than reidentifying.  If A is the physical-functional property that is 
identical to having an experience as of red (recall that we are presupposing physicalism), then 
a thinker can use his phenomenal concept RED-EXPCEPHEN to reidentify physical-functional 
property A.  He can use it to tell when he himself is instantiating A.  Tracking requires 
something more: following that property instance spatio-temporally so as to be able to learn 
more about its patterns of co-instantiation.  There are serious limitations in the extent to 
which we can enrich phenomenal concepts by spatio-temporal tracking, at least using everyday 
means, because of the rather banal fact that their referents are instantiated in our heads.  The 
brain is responsible for the difference between being in one phenomenal state and another, if 
not wholly, then at least largely and importantly so.  When a thinker applies a phenomenal 
concept non-inferentially to himself in virtue of instantiating its referent there is little he can 
do to keep track of that instance of the property spatio-temporally.  He can keep track of 
himself, but that does nothing to differentiate one phenomenal property from another.  He can 
learn about typical causes and effects (fire engines typically cause red experiences, feelings of 
anger typically cause shaking limbs, etc.).  But these modes of application don’t allow the 
thinker to pick out an instance of the phenomenal property which he can follow spatio-
temporally with sufficient fineness of grain so as to learn more about it, as opposed to the 
multitude of other things that are going on in his head.  The very feature that makes 
phenomenal concepts so easy to deploy (non-inferentially to oneself in virtue of instantiating 
an experience) makes it hard to enrich them with many third-person modes of application. 
 As a result, when we are faced with the properties identified by scientists that figure in 
putative physical theories of phenomenality, properties like brain scan traces, cyto-
architectural features of neurons and electrophysiological recordings of firing rates, we have 
no way of seeing how those modes of identification could be ways of identifying the very same 
property as the property we pick out with a phenomenal concept.  The same thing happened to 
Bateson with chromosomes.  Practical limitations on his ways of visualising, identifying, 
manipulating and intervening on chromatin meant that he had no way of plausibly enriching his 
CHROMOSOME concept with the causes and effects of heredity.  Just as limitations on spatio-
temporal tracking disabled Bateson from enriching his CHROMOSOME concept, they also prevented 
him from being able to see how it could co-refer with this BASIS OF HEREDITY concept.  That in 
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turn led to his claim that the identity was inconceivable. 
  When a set of modes of identification C2 stands apart and cannot be integrated with the 
modes of identification associated with an existing concept C1, then C2 cannot but form a 
second concept.  The result will be conceptual redundancy, unknowingly making use of two 
concepts for the same thing, as Bateson did.  One major way that we can come to notice the 
redundancy is by tracking an object that falls under the first concept and noticing that it also 
has the property picked out by the second concept.  I learn something about the property of 
being a raconteur when I predicate RACONTEUR IN A CROWD of someone at a party and find, when I 
track them to a quiet corner later, that the same person falls under the concept TACITURN ONE-
TO-ONE.  In cases where co-instantiation is not apparent at a time, spatio-temporal tracking can 
give us evidence of co-occurrence.  When there is a rich and detailed match in coinstantiated 
properties we can have good reason to conclude that we have been operating with two ways of 
thinking about the same property — that there are not really two different properties at all (as 
in the chromosome / heredity case).  Discovering co-reference does not necessitate that we 
have only one concept, but discovering the identity licences us to merge the two concepts into 
a single concept, which conjoins the modes of application of the two. 
 Similarly with phenomenal properties, the limitations on spatio-temporal tracking that 
usually prevent us enriching our phenomenal concepts with third-personal and scientific means 
of identifying phenomenal properties also block us gathering the kinds of evidence that would 
ordinarily convince us of co-reference.  To do that in the phenomenal case, we would have to 
exercise a phenomenal concept, RED-EXPCEPHEN say, and then track the particular brain state that 
makes it the case that I am experiencing red while seeing that further properties (functional, 
neural, etc.) are predicable of it.  Prosaic limitations on spatio-temporal tracking of 
phenomenal properties identified under a phenomenal concept prevent us from doing so.  
When we apply a phenomenal concept, we may succeed in picking out a phenomenal property, 
but we have no way of tracking it spatio-temporally, other than just by tracking the person 
who is having that experience, with all of her psychological properties.  So limitations on 
spatio-temporal tracking may explain why we resist identities between phenomenal and 
physical-functional concepts, and thereby have a recalcitrant intuition of contingency. 
The resources which account for the intuition of contingency can also form part of an 
explanation of the explanatory gap.8  As usually understood, the explanatory gap arises for 
those who believe there are psycho-physical identities but think there is an obstacle to 
obtaining a satisfactory explanation of why they hold.  My hypothesis is that limitations on the 
ability to enrich phenomenal concepts with third-personal or scientific modes of application, 
and the correlative absence of the kinds of evidence that would convince us that phenomenal 
                                                 
8  Doubtless the absence of a plausible real theory to figure in the identity claims also has a role to play (cf Shea & 
Heyes, 2010), as mentioned above (Stoljar, 2001, 2006). 
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concepts and physical-functional concepts could co-refer, make us feel an explanatory gap.  
The felt gap is the absence of the kinds of considerations that would usually convince us that 
an identity claim is true.  However, this limitation is not deep-rooted.  It is practical and 
contingent.  So the account makes empirical claims that may be falsified.  The final subsection 
suggests how the hypothesis might be tested. 
 
4.2 Testing the hypothesis empirically 
An unusual but attractive feature of the positive story offered above is that it makes an 
empirical prediction.  If the recalcitrance of the intuition of contingency depends partly on 
contingent features of phenomenal concepts which make it hard track their instances spatio-
temporally, then that limitation may be surmountable.  There is no in-principle reason why a 
phenomenal property cannot be tracked starting with a first-personal mode of application.  If 
physicalism is true, the property causing me to predicate RED-EXPCEPHEN of myself is some physical 
property of me (body and brain).  Just as in a third-personal investigation of consciousness, I 
can in principle observe the changes in my own brain that are characteristic of occasions when 
I predicate RED-EXPCEPHEN  of myself.  I can then keep track of that state so as to learn further 
things about it.  The first-personal mode of application is not an insuperable obstacle to 
reliance on tracking to enrich a concept. 
 One situation in which we could track instances of phenomenal properties with greater 
precision is when we are ourselves the subject of an experiment.  Then we could see in a fine-
grained way how the referent of a phenomenal concept covaried with some physical-functional 
properties (e.g. via the read-out of a brain scan), both temporally (when the experience is 
happening) and spatially (where the brain activity is located). 
 Experimental techniques may help people to track phenomenal properties spatially and 
temporally.  Event-related potentials (ERPs: measures of electrical activity on the scalp) and 
magnetoencephalography (MEG: measures of changes in magnetic field caused by currents in 
the brain) can keep track of brain properties at a very fine temporal resolution, allowing us to 
predicate properties our brain has at the same time as we are applying a phenomenal concept 
(e.g. of red experience).  Correlatively, fMRI and PET deliver much better spatial tracking.  And 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) allows us to intervene on phenomenal properties and 
learn for ourselves the effects of such interventions, conceptualising those effects both in 
scientific terms and under first-person applications of phenomenal concepts.  The TMS pulse is 
characterised in the theory of electromagnetism and its effect on the brain in the theory of 
electrophysiology; but I simultaneously experience the effect myself (e.g. I see the 
phosphemes), enabling me to deploy my phenomenal concepts in relation to it.  
Neurobiological feedback is a further source of potentially relevant experience (Weiskopf et 
al., 2004).  The positive story offered above predicts that subjects of these kinds of experience 
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will come to feel the intuition of contingency with less force. 
 This kind of evidence would give subjects good reason to merge phenomenal and 
physical-functional concepts, but it could also stop them forming separate physical-functional 
concepts in the first place.  Instead they may proceed from the start of scientific enquiry by 
enriching their phenomenal concept with new third-personal or scientific modes of application.  
Their concept would still count as a phenomenal concept within definition PC, since it was 
acquired through predicating it of oneself while instantiating the phenomenal property, but it 
would gradually lose the feature that makes for the recalcitrant intuited contingency, since it 
would not be stuck with a limited set of modes of application that resist integration with other 
third-person modes of application.  If a subject starts with two concepts and comes to merge 
them, then the merged concept would also arguably fall under PC, but would again have lost 
the (contingent) feature that leads many people’s phenomenal concepts to generate an illusion 
of contingency. 
 Some preliminary confirmation of this hypothesis can be had by asking psychologists and 
cognitive neuroscientists about the intuition of contingency.  Anecdotally, they do indeed tend 
not to feel the force of the intuition of contingency.  Since that could be an effect of scientific 
instruction, or even because of selection effects, surveying the intuitions of scientists would 
not be a good way to test the hypothesis.  An appropriate test would be to take two matched 
groups of naïve subjects, giving one group experiences of the type suggested above, while 
giving the other group an equal amount of additional knowledge about phenomenal properties, 
but doing so only via physical-functional concepts (as if they were Mary in the black and white 
room).  If the positive story I have sketched is right, then the first group should, after training, 
be less wedded to the intuition of contingency, relative to the second group.  (The extra 
scientific knowledge may have an effect of lessening the intuition of contingency even in the 
second group, but the link to first-personal applications in the first group should produce a 
larger effect.)  Existing evidence makes this hypothesis sufficiently plausible to be worth 
testing, but only such tests will show whether it is correct. 
 
 
(5) Conclusion 
The intuited contingency between the physical and the phenomenal is incompatible with 
physicalism.  However, if physicalism is true, the contingency can be explained away.  We have 
a special class of phenomenal concepts of our own experiences.  This allows us to formulate 
contingency, despite its metaphysical impossibility.  Physicalists are still faced with the 
challenge of explaining why the intuition of contingency should be recalcitrant in the face of 
good evidence that physicalism is true, and thus that some identities between phenomenal 
concepts and physical-functional concepts obtain, and so are necessarily true.  Leading 
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attempts to do so rely on there being a phenomenal difference between thinking with physical-
functional concepts and thinking with phenomenal concepts.  Existing psychological data make 
that claim unsustainable. 
 Other suggestions for explaining the recalcitrant intuition of contingency are also 
problematic.  But the conclusions of this paper are not wholly negative.  It suggests an 
alternative explanation, based on prosaic limitations people usually face in tracking instances 
of phenomenal properties, when they are identified in the first-personal non-inferential way 
that is distinctive of phenomenal concepts.  That hypothesis can be tested by seeing whether 
scientific techniques that enrich our phenomenal concepts with third-person modes of 
application also reduce the force of the intuition of contingency.  The intuition has had a 
strong influence in philosophy of mind.  Explaining it away would remove a substantial obstacle 
to physicalism about phenomenal properties. 
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